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"SHOW ME THE MONEY":
STATE V. WESTERN UNION FINANCIAL
SER VICES AND THE JURISDICTIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTRONIC DEBTS
ANTHONY BAGNUOLAt
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: A resident of Tijuana,
Mexico harvests large amounts of marijuana on farmland a few
hundred miles south of the California border. A Las Vegas
resident enters into an agreement with this farmer to have
certain amounts of this crop smuggled across the California
border and transported north to Las Vegas by his associate. The
buyer agrees to pay the seller when the buyer's associate enters
the United States with the marijuana. The parties agree that
the buyer will "wire" money via Western Union into an account
created by the seller, which the seller can retrieve at any
Western Union business location in the United States or Mexico.
In an effort to stymie the use of its border as a conduit for
illegal drug smuggling, the California Attorney General applies
for a seizure warrant, which would freeze the transmittal of
electronic funds that represent the proceeds of the sale. What
result?
These circumstances present a significant jurisdictional
impediment to the confiscation of the drug-related funds: the
ability to successfully exercise personal jurisdiction.'
t Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Pennsylvania State University. The author
would like to thank Professor Robert Ruescher for his invaluable assistance and
unending support.
1 This Note explores the jurisdictional issues raised in civil forfeiture actions
only. See infra Part I.B. To that end, all discussion of personal jurisdiction assumes
that the individual participants to the underlying conduct are not being criminally
prosecuted or civilly adjudged.
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It is axiomatic that before a court may adjudicate a claim
against an individual--or, in this instance, order the seizure of
her assets-two criteria must be met: The court must establish
its jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the lawsuit and
the parties involved therein.2 This Note addresses the latter
requirement.
Before a California court can determine the rights of the
non-residents in the hypothetical above, fundamental notions of
state sovereignty require some meaningful nexus between the
non-resident and the state.' In other words, yielding only the
"power to determine . . . the civil status and capacities of its
inhabitants," a state's ability to adjudge non-residents is justified
by those individuals' activities there.4 This justification lays the
jurisdictional foundation for the institution of a lawsuit and the
authority of the forum state to properly issue or enforce binding
orders on the parties.5 However, the parties in the hypothetical
did not engage in any significant conduct in California: Neither
party is domiciled in the state; no drugs were produced in state;
no money or drugs were exchanged in the state; and, it is
unlikely these particular parties have done business there before.
More likely, the California border was crossed purely as a matter
of convenience and therefore bears no discernible relationship to
the participants of the underlying conduct.
Where jurisdiction over potential parties is unavailable,
however, each state statutorily recognizes an alternative basis
for intervention: jurisdiction over property, or jurisdiction in
rem.6  So, in the hypothetical, California may, to the fullest
2 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1063.1 (3d ed. 2011) ("It is well-established that a federal court must have
jurisdiction over both the person of the defendant .. . and the subject matter of the
action before deciding the merits of the dispute.").
Id. at § 1063 ("[The current philosophy is that the defendant must have
sufficient contacts with the forum so that the maintenance of a suit against her in
that locale does not offend traditional notions of 'fair play and substantial justice.'"
(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))).
* Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (second emphasis added).
6 See id. at 720.
6 These laws, often called "long arm" statutes, permit the exercise of jurisdiction
over non-residents under certain circumstances. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(4)
(McKinney 2010) (allowing for the exercise of jurisdiction over "any non-
domiciliary . .. who in person or through an agent.. . . owns, uses or
possesses ... property situated within the state"). For a comprehensive survey of all
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extent allowed by the Constitution,' exercise its jurisdiction over
the wire transfer itself in an attempt to halt the trafficking
of drugs across its border. Unfortunately, much of the
law interpreting the constitutional boundaries of personal
jurisdiction adheres to territorial limitations that have been
rigidly in place for centuries.' Generally, the presence of
particular property in a given state is necessary for courts of that
state to adjudicate the rights to it. Thus, intangible forms of
property-for example, a Western Union wire transfer-present
unique challenges to prevailing notions of in rem jurisdiction.
Indeed, courts continue to struggle over situations like our
hypothetical, where a state attempts to exercise in rem
jurisdiction to seize property that is not physically "there."
Recently, in State v. Western Union Financial Services, Inc.,' the
Arizona Supreme Court grappled with just such a situation,
except the transaction was not one for marijuana; it was for
humans.
The southwestern states are frequently used as corridors
through which immigrants from Mexico gain illegal entry into
the United States.o States' attempts to combat the profitable
human trafficking enterprise have proven futile, largely because
fifty states' long-arm statutes, see DAVID L. DOYLE, LONG-ARM STATuTES: A FIFTY-
STATE SURVEY (2003), available at http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/
Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf. This form of jurisdiction is discussed at length
below. See infra Part L.A.
7 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010).
8 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1070 ("[Jlurisdiction during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries both in England and the United States was
based upon a territorial concept. To exercise [personal] jurisdiction, the court had to
have 'power' over the defendant and this power was predicated on the physical
presence of the defendant within the court's territory."); see also Catherine Ross
Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has Misdirected the Federal
Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 563 (2009)
(noting that influential Supreme Court decisions "incorporated the traditions of
territoriality into a modern era of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process").
9 208 P.3d 218 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
10 The International Organization for Migration's (the "IOM") "statistics indicate
that an estimated 700,000 to 2 million women and children are trafficked globally
each year." See Human Smuggling: Definitions and Statistics, CNN.CoM (Mar. 3,
2002 9:22 PM), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcflauspac/03/01/
smuggling.stats/index.html. "The IOM estimates ... the worldwide proceeds of
[human] trafficking to be US $10 billion [per] year." Id. Additionally, in 2002, more
than fifty percent of illegal immigrants in the world were being assisted by
smugglers. Id.
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the elusiveness of the culprits often makes prosecution
economically and judicially unfeasible." Similarly, smuggling
operations have been facilitated by modern technological trends
in financial transactions, that is, the ability to instantly and
inexpensively "wire" money long distances via services like
Western Union. 2 As noted, the ability to intercept these
payments turns on a fundamental concept of personal
jurisdiction: where the property, in this case "electronic credits"
representing a monetary transaction, is located. 3
Wire transfers exemplify a type of intangible property
unique to the twenty-first century. 4  To the extent that wired
funds are retrievable in multiple locations simultaneously, they
are unlike the intangibles contemplated by traditional in rem
jurisprudence.'5 This Note argues for the revival of a century-old
doctrine in order to effectively "locate" contemporary species of
ubiquitous property. The Supreme Court's 1905 decision in
Harris v. Balk16 relied on the legal fiction that "a debt follows its
debtor"" in order to uphold a Maryland court's jurisdiction over
an out-of-state resident." Beginning from the premise that
Western Union is essentially a debtor that undertakes to pay
sums of money owed to creditors, this Note argues that Harris'
central underpinning-situating a debt with its debtor-should
be applied to permit the seizure of electronic funds wherever
Western Union does business. With the contemporary issue of
human smuggling as a backdrop, and the characters of the drug-
n See, e.g., Sean Holstege, Human-Smuggling Rings Change Tactics, TUSCAN
CITIZEN.COM (July 14, 2008), http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/ss/byauthor/90846
("[Investigators crack down and the smugglers counter, shifting where and how
they collect payments from illegal immigrants. The two sides repeat their sparring,
like two grand masters mapping out their paths on a chessboard.").
12 Id.
13 See State v. Kaufman, 201 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Iowa 1972) ("Search warrant
proceedings are in rem, directed primarily against the property, not the owner.").
" See infra notes 110-11.
'6 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247 nn.16-17 (1958) (recognizing
that stocks, bonds and notes, although intangible, are embodied in documents and
therefore "makes them partake of the nature of tangibles" capable of being located in
one place).
16 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
" See State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 224 (Ariz. 2009) (quoting
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1980)).
" Harris is discussed at greater length infra Part I.A.
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trafficking hypothetical as guides, this Note explores the tension
between an antiquated personal jurisdiction framework and a
never-before-seen brand of intangible property.
Part I discusses the evolution of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence and the difficulties that modern varieties of
intangible property pose to established analyses. Specifically,
while most jurisdictions have acknowledged the difficulties
inherent in assigning a "location" to intangible property," few
have attempted to update existing precedent to accommodate
modern scenarios.20
Part II examines the recent Arizona decision in State v.
Western Union Financial Services, Inc., where the Supreme
Court of Arizona confronted the "location" of electronic debts as
an issue of first impression.2 '
Part III argues for the Harris fiction's relevance in the
modern era. The complexities of modern society demand the
resuscitation of the doctrine to adequately cope with an emerging
brand of intangible property. This Part posits that Harris
applies more than ever, as innovative forms of property are
becoming accessible any and everywhere; the holding of Harris
is, then, no longer a fiction at all. This section also advances a
two-pronged inquiry for assessing a state's legal basis to exercise
jurisdiction over such property: (1) whether the property at issue
19 See, e.g., Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d
706, 714 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a
concept as is known to the law."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1071
("[D]etermining the situs of intangible property, such as notes, bonds, and debts, let
alone even more evanescent forms of property, for jurisdictional purposes long has
been a source of difficulty and confusion.").
20 See Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names To Enforce Judgments:
Looking Back To Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 95 (2003) ("One of the
challenges faced by lawyers, judges, and legislators is determining whether the
rights created by the movement of business to the Internet are truly new rights that
need new governing laws or variations of existing rights to which existing legal
concepts are easily adapted. Today we watch the law struggle to adapt traditional
contract law to electronic transactions, to mold the action of trespass to chattels to
cover unauthorized use of a web site, and to find an electronic equivalent to
negotiable instruments."); cf. Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the
Resolution of E-Commerce Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient, and
Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 3 ("Courts in the U.S. have been
desperately trying to adapt their pre-Internet legal systems to adjudicate post-
Internet online legal disputes.").
21 208 P.3d 218, 220 (2009).
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is simultaneously accessible in multiple locations simultaneously;
and (2) whether the property exhibits a meaningful connection
with the forum state.
I. THE DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. A Historical Context
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has undergone significant
transformation and expansion since its inception in the 1800s.
Still, "some historical perspective is necessary as a background
against which to view the present jurisdictional standards."2 2
Thus, before one can fully appreciate the jurisdictional quagmire
intangibles present, a deeper understanding of personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence throughout the last century is crucial.
1. Pennoyer and Place Theory
Although the groundwork for modern personal jurisdiction
analysis was in place prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment,23 the Supreme Court's 1877 decision in Pennoyer v.
Neff 4 marked its first attempt to develop a framework for
determining the constitutional parameters of personal
jurisdiction. Pennoyer became the fountainhead for a wealth of
cases that would eventually attempt to define the breadth of a
state's power to reach potential defendants outside of its
territorial borders.2 5 The Pennoyer Court, per Justice Field,
recognized four bases for a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant. 26  An individual was not subject to a state's
jurisdiction unless he (1) appeared in a court of the state; (2) was
found within the state; (3) was a resident of the state; or
(4) owned property in the state.27 Thus, Pennoyer adopted a
22 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1064.
' See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 8, at 561 n.5 (noting Pennoyer's reliance on
several cases decided before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
concerning issues of personal jurisdiction).
24 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
25 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1064.
26 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
27 Id.
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"distinctly territorial approach to establish the constitutional
limits," focusing the inquiry on whether a person or her property
were physically in the state.28
2. International Shoe and the Birth of a Mobile Nation
The next significant development in the field came nearly
seventy years later in the form of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,"2  from which the widely-accepted "minimum
contacts" analysis was born. There, a Delaware corporation that
employed a handful of traveling salesmen in Washington was
amenable to suit there.30 Despite the fact that the company had
no offices in Washington, made no contracts for sale there, and
kept no merchandise there, the Court found that International
Shoe's business in Washington was of such a substantial nature
as to make it "reasonable and just according to [its] traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit
[Washington] to enforce the obligations which [International
Shoe had] incurred there."" The Court, per Justice Stone,
endorsed a theory of personal jurisdiction that eschewed
Pennoyer's reliance on "place" and instead hinged on the
meaningful activities an individual conducted within a state-the
"minimum contacts" necessary to hale her into court there. The
Court's approach envisioned the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
residents based upon "the quality and nature of [their] activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws ....
Thus, the constitutional inquiry announced in Pennoyer was
expanded to contemplate a measure of fairness as opposed to
" State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 221 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc);
see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 ("[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory."); David J. Baker, Note, The
Ex Parte Attachment of Nonresidents' Personal Property in Connecticut: A Statutory
Revitalization of Harris v. Balk "Attachment Jurisdiction"?, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 651, 657 (1991) ("Under the doctrine enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff, states had
'power' to assert jurisdiction over all persons, property, and claims arising from
property within their borders."); Dunham, supra note 8, at 563 ("The [Pennoyer]
Court's value of territoriality forms the foundation of modern personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Despite the emerging tensions of growth, the Court required some
contact with the territory as a basis for personal jurisdiction.").
29 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30 Id. at 313-14.
31 Id. at 320.
12 Id. at 319.
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strictly territorial concerns. For the first time, jurisdiction could
properly be obtained over a non-resident whose activities in a
state made it "reasonable and just" to adjudicate claims arising
from those activities.3 3
Significantly, while appearing at first blush to deviate from a
one-dimensional analysis, many have been reluctant to view
International Shoe as "a wholesale abandonment of the
territoriality framework of Pennoyer."34 Rather, commentators
contend that the development stood for little more than merely a
progression in a "longstanding theory of territoriality," noting
that "It]he very essence of the minimum contacts test is an
evaluation of the defendant's physical contacts within the forum
state.... Thus, the minimum contacts analysis is rooted in the
notion of 'place,' just as the Court's analysis in ... Pennoyer[ ]"
was.35
Moving forward after International Shoe, the Court's body of
personal jurisdiction law snowballed to eventually spawn a long
line of decisions augmenting the original "minimum contacts"
analysis.3 ' However, the effects of International Shoe and its
progeny were felt only in the realm of cases dealing with so-
called "in personam" jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction over the
person. While the Court worked to refine the various tests to
determine the constitutionality of a state's jurisdictional power
over a person, one of the foundational bases for exercising
" Id. at 320. International Shoe recognized two different "types" of personal
jurisdiction that could be exercised depending on the quality and nature of a
defendant's activities within a state. On the one hand, so-called "general
jurisdiction" exists where a defendant's activities in the forum state represent
continuous operations that are "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities." Id. at 318 (emphasis added). On the other hand, where the "continuous
and systematic" activities of a defendant "also give rise to the liabilities sued on," so-
called "specific jurisdiction" exists. Id. at 317.
3' Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 138
(2000).
*6 Dunham, supra note 8, at 565.
36 See id. ("[International Shoe's] structure has been refined and updated with
more detailed interpretations of the test, including the development of sub-tests for
purposeful availment through contracting and placing products into the stream of
commerce."); see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
804 [Vol. 85:797
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jurisdiction announced in Pennoyer-jurisdiction over her
property-was left intact and remained contingent upon the
presence of that property within the state."
a. In Rem and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
Surviving the overhaul of personal jurisdiction doctrine was
the notion that a state court can take jurisdiction over property
"when one or more of the defendants or persons with potential
claims to the property are nonresidents or jurisdiction over their
person cannot be secured in the forum state."3 8 Such property-
based jurisdiction is commonly divided into two broad categories:
in rem and quasi in rem.3 9 The former permits a court to "take[ I
jurisdiction over the property so as to adjudicate ownership of
that property."4 0 Therefore, in a "true" in rem situation, the
property itself is the subject of the litigation.4 1 Quasi in rem
proceedings, however, are "basically what the name implies-a
halfway house between in rem and in personam jurisdiction."42
In these types of actions, although jurisdiction is grounded in the
defendant's property, the claim asserted is unrelated to the
property itself.4 3 So, paradoxically, even after the Court
countenanced a meaningful nexus between the forum and the
subject of litigation in International Shoe, a plaintiff could
nevertheless obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident merely by
attaching her in-state property and subsequently suing on a
completely unrelated claim.
b. The Harris Doctrine and Due Process Implications
Prior to International Shoe, the due process problems
inherent in adjudicating claims against non-residents for conduct
unrelated to the forum state were apparent. In Harris v. Balk,'
decided forty years before International Shoe, the Supreme Court
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
38 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1070.
3 See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 5, at 29.
40 Id.
41 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1070 ("Conceptually, in rem jurisdiction
operates directly on the property and the court's judgment is effective against all
persons who have an interest in the property.").
42 Id.
43 Id.
" 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
052011]
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was confronted with determining the constitutionality of a state's
finding of jurisdiction over a transient debtor. Harris, a North
Carolina resident, owed money to Balk. Balk, in turn, owed
money to Epstein, a Maryland resident.4 6 When Harris traveled
to Maryland, Epstein served him with process and a Maryland
court entered judgment requiring Harris to pay Epstein the
money Harris owed to Balk.47 The Supreme Court, invoking a
theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction, upheld the judgment as
constitutional, characterizing the debt as intangible property
that followed its debtor and was therefore "located" wherever
Harris was found.48 It followed, the Court explained, that so long
as this property was present in Maryland, the state had a proper
foundation for exercising jurisdiction over Harris and issuing a
binding judgment. Harris's jurisdictional significance was
paramount: For the first time, a state could exercise jurisdiction
over "not only all claims involving persons and property within
its borders [,J but also claims involving intangible obligations
arising" therein. 9 The new doctrine was immediately
controversial, as it often "permitted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to
be exercised over a defendant in a forum with which neither he
nor his activities had any logical connection."o Significantly, a
plaintiff could suddenly "garnish a defendant's .. . debtors
wherever they happened to be doing business.""
In its 1977 decision Shaffer v. Heitner,12 the Court attempted
to synch the gap in its reasoning between Pennoyer and
International Shoe that caused the jurisdictional loophole
exploited in Harris. In Shaffer, the Court declared that "all
assertions of state court jurisdiction," whether in rem, quasi in
rem, or in personam, "must be evaluated according to the
45 Id. at 216.
46 Id.
4 Id.
4 Id. at 222-23; see also Baker, supra note 28, at 659-60 ("[The Harris Court]
found that the intangible obligation to repay 'clings to and accompanies the [debtor]
wherever he goes.' Thus, Harris' debt to Balk was 'property' that was ripe for
attachment by the courts of any state into which Harris happened to wander."
(second alteration in original) (quoting Harris, 198 U.S. at 222)).
4 Baker, supra note 28, at 660.
s0 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1071 at 297.
" See Baker, supra note 28, at 660 n.41.
52 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
806 [Vol. 85:797
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[minimum contacts analysis] set forth in International Shoe [sic]
and its progeny."3 On its face, Shaffer appeared to reject the
curious Harris fiction and abolish the practice of taking
jurisdiction over a non-resident on attenuated bases. More
importantly, this pronouncement seemed to disclaim wholesale a
core Pennoyer principle: that in rem jurisdiction may, without
more, be validly based on property's presence in a particular
state.5 4
Notwithstanding its matter-of-fact language, the Court
backpedaled on the issue of "true" in rem jurisdiction, explaining
that its holding was, after all, true to Pennoyer's territorial
principle. "[W]hen claims to ... property itself are the source of
the underlying controversy," the Court implored, "it would be
unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
jurisdiction."" Consistent with International Shoe's teachings,
"iln such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the
State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from
the State's protection of his interest[ ]" and therefore satisfy the
requirement that a minimum nexus be demonstrated between
himself and the forum.56
Therefore, Shaffer's import is narrower than its sweeping
language suggests. Rather than espouse a uniform standard for
exercising personal jurisdiction, the Court conceded the limited
reach of its decision: "[J]urisdiction over many types of
" Id. at 212; see also Andrew J. Grotto, Note, Due Process and In Rem
Jurisdiction Under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLUM. SC.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) ("In Shaffer, the Supreme Court found that assertions of
quasi in rem jurisdiction must be accompanied by a showing of minimum contacts
equivalent to those necessary for personal jurisdiction under International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.").
' State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 228-31 (Ariz. 2009) (en
banc) (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
[Tihe Court has never overruled or disavowed the underpinning of Harris-
the common law doctrine that the legal situs of an intangible obligation is
the situs of the obligor. Rather, the Court has simply pointed out the due
process problems with attempting to ground jurisdiction over individuals
on nothing more than the theoretical location of a debt.
Id. at 228.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
* Id. at 207-08.
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actions ... brought in rem would not be affected by [our] holding
that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the
International Shoe [sic] standard.""
In effect, Shaffer was reactionary to the surprising result
reached in Harris. Indeed, it made clear that "the presence
of ... property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction"
only with regard to the limited "type of quasi in rem action
typified by Harris v. Balk [,] ... where the property
which . . . serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is
completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action."" Thus,
Shaffer eschewed the purely territorial approach touted in
Pennoyer only to the extent it applied to quasi in rem actions,
that is, where no logical nexus existed to connect the subject of
litigation to the forum state. Left unscathed was the
conventional expectation that "true" in rem jurisdiction-where
the property itself is the subject of litigation-may still rest on
the presence of property in the forum state alone."
B. Seizure Warrants and Civil Forfeiture
The issuance of seizure warrants in civil actions necessarily
implicates the principles of in rem jurisdiction. A civil seizure
warrant, at its core, is a type of civil forfeiture, which is in fact a
misnomer. A civil forfeiture describes the power of the
government, through the Attorney General or some other law
enforcement entity, to confiscate property alleged to have been
used in the commission of a crime. 0 Indeed, criminal forfeiture
is a wholly separate animal. The quasi-criminal nature of civil
forfeiture proceedings notwithstanding, it is well-settled that the
issuance of seizure warrants are civil actions governed by
principles of civil procedure." Confusing though the admittedly
n Id. at 208.
* Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added).
* See Dickstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 685 A.2d 943,
948 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996) ("Shaffer held that a forum could not use
quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the
property had no nexus to the litigation.").
6o See People v. 1995 Ford Van, 809 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
61 See People v. Powell, 812 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("[A] forfeiture
action is clearly a civil proceeding." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
People v. Glenn, 492 N.E. 2d 957, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986))). While civil forfeiture acts
in rem against property itself, criminal forfeiture conversely acts in personam as a
808 [Vol. 85:797
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related concepts appear, courts have illuminated their
similarities and marked their doctrinal differences. As the Ninth
Circuit explained:
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against the res, on the
legal fiction that the property itself is "guilty." To achieve civil
forfeiture, the government generally must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the culpability of the owner and
a nexus between the property and the illegal activity.
By contrast, criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding
against the defendant personally and is part of the defendant's
punishment. Accordingly, to achieve criminal forfeiture, the
government first must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant is guilty of the crime. The government then must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the
property and the crime.
The two types of forfeiture actions have much in common.
Both seek the same result: forfeiture of the property. Both arise
from exactly the same facts: the owner's illegal activities. Both
involve the same plaintiff: the government. Both require that
the government establish the same general determination: proof
by preponderance of the evidence of a nexus between the
property and the illegal activity.62
Civil forfeiture, therefore, is an action brought against
property, with the government proceeding under the legal fiction
that the object is the offender, not its owner. The law
"ascrib[es] to the property a certain personality, a power of
complicity and guilt in the wrong."6 4 While the possessor of the
property may not be adjudged guilty of any criminal offense, the
property seized is "of such a nature that it should
punishment against a party guilty of committing a crime. For example, a law
authorizing a judge to forfeit the automobile of an individual convicted of driving
while intoxicated is a criminal forfeiture. See United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225,
1231-32 (11th Cir. 2007).
62 United States v. Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139,
1149-50 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
' See Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2007); United States
v. $10,409.00 in U.S. Currency, 585 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2008); State v.
Kaufman, 201 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Iowa 1972).
64 Von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 184 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510
(1921))-
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be ... confiscated by the [government]."65 In other words, the
doctrine serves a remedial purpose, allowing the government to
take control of property that was used for unlawful purposes,
whether or not the person in control of the property has been
found guilty of a crime.6 6
Nevertheless, the parallel concepts diverge in one important
respect:
To achieve criminal forfeiture, the government must prove
culpability beyond a reasonable doubt; to achieve civil
forfeiture, however, the government must prove culpability only
by a preponderance of the evidence. For that reason, if the
government's criminal prosecution of the property owner fails,
that failure does not prevent the government from pursuing
civil forfeiture. The government may pursue civil forfeiture even
after a failed criminal prosecution.67
Accordingly, a seizure warrant may appropriately be issued
pre-conviction or without a conviction at all. This notion of
proceeding against the property, rather than the individual
culprit, coupled with the less stringent burden of proof applied in
personal jurisdiction proceedings-a fair preponderance of the
evidence-clarifies the actions of the California Attorney General
in our hypothetical. Recall that, when tasked with combating a
multi-national drug enterprise, the Attorney General found itself
bedeviled by unidentified criminals masterfully evading
prosecution. Civil forfeiture emerges as a powerfully efficient
weapon of the law: Though prosecution is unsuccessful, a state
may, by satisfying a relatively lenient evidentiary burden,
nevertheless get its hands on the proceeds of illicit activity.
65 Gambling Paraphernalia, Devices, Equip. & Proceeds v. State, 22 S.W.3d 625,
627 (Tex. App. 2000) (emphasis added).
6 See United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718-19 (1971) ("The
forfeiture statute ... simply authorizes confiscation of 'any property intended for use
in violating the provisions of the internal revenue laws'; it does not require that
[defendant] be the one who possessed the requisite intention." (quoting
26 U.S.C. § 7302 (2006)).
67 Liquidators of European Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d at 1150 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
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The law of forfeiture is a creature of statute. Arguably
dating back to the Old Testament,"8 statutory in rem forfeiture is
the only action of England's three forfeiture laws that this
country adopted. Currently, modern statutes confer broad
forfeiture power to both state and federal law enforcement."
Arizona's civil forfeiture statute7 1 was the catalyst for
Western Union. Section 13-2314 of the Arizona Revised Statutes
mirrors the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") statute, which criminalizes far-flung
activities ranging from murder and kidnapping to bribery, fraud,
and drug-dealing.7 2 Like the RICO statute, the Arizona version
provides for, in addition to criminal liability, civil penalties for
these activities. It reads, in pertinent part:
The superior court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, and
remedy racketeering ... by issuing appropriate orders.
Prior to a determination of liability such orders may include,
but are not limited to, issuing seizure warrants ....
... [T]he attorney general or a county attorney may file an in
rem action . .. for forfeiture ... of:
All proceeds traceable to an offense . .. and all monies,
negotiable instruments, securities and other property used or
intended to be used in any manner or part to facilitate the
commission of the offense.7 4
Accordingly, the superior court is authorized, upon
application of the Arizona Attorney General, to issue a pre-
judgment in rem warrant to seize the proceeds of racketeering
" United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 918 (11th Cir. 2001).
69 See United States v. $10,409.00 in U.S. Currency, 585 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12
(D.D.C. 2008).
70 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2006) (authorizing civil forfeiture of properties
as a drug abuse prevention measure); 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(A) (2006) (authorizing
pre-judgment seizure of property); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1311(b) (McKinney 2011)
(empowering law enforcement officials to institute civil forfeiture actions against
proceeds of criminal conduct before any individual has been charged).
71 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(A)-(C), (G)(3) (2011) (authorizing the
issuance of, inter alia, seizure warrants "[pirior to a determination of liability").
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006).
n Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(C) (2011), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963
(West 2011), and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).
74 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(B)-(C), (G)(3) (2011) (footnote omitted).
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operations within the state. As we will see, in its application
for a seizure warrant pursuant to this section, the Attorney
General alleged that the Western Union transfers at issue
represented not only the proceeds of illegal human trafficking,
but also narcotics trafficking. While these illicit activities fall
comfortably within the range of punishable behavior,"7 exercising
the requisite jurisdiction over such proceeds prove especially
difficult when it came to "locating" them.
C. Modern Difficulties: Obtaining Jurisdiction over Intangible
Property in the Twenty-First Century
Bob Dylan famously sang, "the times, they are a-changin," a
sentiment that aptly describes a modern society that has
witnessed groundbreaking legal developments. For example,
consider the modern transformation of an age-old fixture of the
law: service of process. In recent years, American courts have
approved the expansion of methods of service to include fax, then
e-mail, and may one day join the growing international trend of
service via social networking sites like Facebook." Indeed, the
legal climate has no choice but to adapt to a hyper-mobile,
globalized society. Despite courts' best efforts to modernize
their approaches, the substantive law governing jurisdiction over
intangible property has made little headway since its once-
controversial inception in the 1900s. 79 This has resulted in the
judiciary's use of inconsistent and antiquated methods for
analyzing the jurisdictional authority of state and federal
government over state-of-the-art property.80  Of particular
6 Id. § 13-2314(A)-(C), (G)(3).
16 See id. § 13-2301(D)(4)(b)(xi), (xxx).
7 See Andriana L. Shultz, Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process
via Social Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1497-98 (2009).
8 It has been recognized "that the judiciary, both domestic and abroad, has
begun to accept electronic methods of communication." Id. at 1498 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
" See id. at 1499-1500 ("In the decades that followed [Pennoyer] ... the growth
and commercial expansion of the country rendered Pennoyer's conception of personal
jurisdiction unworkable."); Galves, supra note 20, at 6-7; Lee, supra note 34, at 145
("[P]rinciples of territorial jurisdiction have been stretched by the increased
globalization effected by new technology.").
so The issue of uncertainty has already arisen as courts are increasingly called
upon to adjudicate disputes originating on the Internet. See Teresa J. Cassidy, Note,
Effects of the "Effects Test": Problems of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet;
[Vol. 85:797812
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importance to this Note is the continued use, or lack thereof, of
the Harris fiction in determining the "location" of ubiquitous
varieties of intangible property.8 '
Although there is a dearth of recent case law that purports
to determine the jurisdictional significance of "new" forms of
intangible property, the judges that decided Western Union
focused their respective arguments on two federal cases: United
States v. Daccarett82 and Rush v. Savchuk."3  Some discussion of
these cases is critical to an understanding of the Western Union
decision.
1. United States v. Daccarett
Daccarett considered the "location" of electronic fund
transfers ("EFTs") in a civil forfeiture proceeding.8 4  There, the
Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008), 9
WYO. L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2009) ("Inconsistency in the application of personal
jurisdiction analysis by the courts creates confusion for citizens and legal scholars
alike. With courts facing similar factual situations and different results, the body of
law surrounding Internet jurisdiction remains murky."); see also Galves, supra note
20, at 1 (noting that with the advent of the Internet, came "[oln-demand
entertainment, instantaneous personal communication, and immediate access to
virtually any information in the world"). Consequently, courts are continuously
searching for novel approaches to resolving legal issues and disputes that arise from
modern technology. See id. at 3.
81 This Note will only deal with common law developments in the area and will
not analyze individual states' statutory schemes for addressing the location of
intangible property.
82 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
83 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
* The Second Circuit explained the meaning of EFTs and how they are
used:
When a customer wants to commence an EFT, its bank sends a message
to the transfer system's central computer, indicating the amount of money
to be transferred, the sending bank, the receiving bank, and the intended
beneficiary. The central computer then adjusts the account balances of the
sending and receiving banks and generates a printout of a debit ticket at
the sending bank and a credit ticket at the receiving bank. After the
receiving bank gets the credit ticket, it notifies the beneficiary of the
transfer. If the originating bank and the destination bank belong to the
same wire transfer system, then they are the only sending and receiving
banks, and the transfer can be completed in one transaction. However, if
the originating bank and the destination bank are not members of the same
wire transfer system, which is often the case with international transfers,
it is necessary to transfer the funds by a series of transactions through one
or more intermediary banks.
Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 43-44.
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claimants were associates of a Columbian drug-trafficking
enterprise that was responsible for importing thousands of
kilograms of cocaine each month into the United States.8 5  To
that end, it maintained bank accounts throughout the United
States, Europe, and Central and South America to store and
move its narcotics proceeds." Three members of the cartel were
arrested in Luxembourg and, "[a]nticipating that these arrests
would trigger an effort by the cartel to move its monies to
Colombia before they could be confiscated, Luxembourg law-
enforcement authorities requested the assistance of several
countries to freeze monies related to the cartel." Through both
oral orders and a series of eight in rem warrants, government
agents instructed the intermediary banks in New York to freeze
the seized funds. Eventually, $12 million were seized in the
United States, representing the aggregate of dozens of EFTs sent
through New York City intermediary banks that had
correspondent banking relationships with Panamanian and
Colombian banks.89
In determining the propriety of this law enforcement
measure, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a
New York district court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction, relying
on the fiction that the EFTs had physically "stopped" at the New
York intermediary bank where they were seized." In doing so,
the court rejected the rationale advanced by the defendants: that
EFTs represent nothing more than electronic communications
between banks; mere series of contractual obligations to pay
85 Id.
6 Id. at 43.
* Id. at 44.
* See id.
9 See id.
9 See id. at 54.
While claimants would have us believe that modern technology moved the
funds from the originating bank through the intermediary bank to their
ultimate destination without stopping, that was not the case. With each
EFT at least two separate transactions occurred: first, funds moved from
the originating bank to the intermediary bank; then the intermediary bank
was to transfer the funds to the destination bank, a correspondent bank in
Colombia.... Each of the amounts at issue was seized at the intermediary
bank after the first transaction had concluded and before the second had
begun.
Id.
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money." By defendants' logic-which would later be echoed in a
dissenting opinion to Western Union9 2-the intercepted funds
could not logically be considered "property" capable of seizure
when they were transferred through the New York intermediary
banks. Instead, the court held that EFTs become seizable
property in a particular state if and when they take the form of
bank credits" at a particular bank.9 4
The court's rationale in Daccarett exemplifies the judiciary's
reticence to deviate from traditional property notions when
confronted with modern technological trends. The court
conceptualized the electronic money transfers as tangible
property-"bank credits" capable of "stopping" at an
intermediary bank9 5-rather than as a debt owed by one bank to
another, thereby sidestepping the Harris inquiry altogether.
Indeed, the Western Union court cited Daccarrett with approval
when remarking that "[t]he technical complexities of the
electronic age should not blind courts to the substance of
transactions in conducting jurisdictional analyses." Despite the
reality that the electronic money transfers were no more
"present" in New York than any other place, the court treated the
New York bank's routing of the credits as embodying a physical
transaction that could be located in the forum state for seizure
purposes.
2. Rush v. Savchuk
Rush came much closer than Daccarett to squarely
conducting a modern Harris inquiry. In Rush, the Plaintiff, an
Indiana resident, was a passenger in a car driven by another
Indiana citizen when the car was involved in an automobile
accident in Indiana.9" Savchuk, the vehicle's passenger, brought
91 See id.
9 State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 230 & n.12 (Ariz. 2009) (en
banc) (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
9 See infra note 121 (explaining the meaning and significance of "electronic
credit").
* Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 54-55.
* Id. at 54.
* W. Union, 208 P.3d at 223-24.
9 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980).
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suit in Minnesota after attaching the obligation of the driver's
insurer, State Farm, to pay its insurance claims. State Farm,
like Western Union, conducts business in every state."
The Plaintiffs argument for proper jurisdiction was derived
from "combining the legal fiction that assigns a situs to a
debt .. . wherever the debtor is found with the legal fiction that a
corporation is 'present,' for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it
does business . . . ."9 Therefore, he argued, State Farm's
contractual obligation to defend and indemnify Rush in
connection with liability claims should be treated as a debt owed
by State Farm that is "located" anywhere the claim may be
paid."oo As indicated, given State Farm's extensive presence in
the industry, Savchuk's reasoning would permit the claim to be
paid wherever State Farm does business: everywhere in the
United States. It follows, then, that Minnesota was as legitimate
a forum as any to demand payment.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an exercise of
quasi in rem jurisdiction was improper because the driver had no
Minnesota contacts. 0 1 Invoking the spirit of International Shoe,
the Court, per Justice Marshall, concluded that since the
defendant did not engage in any purposeful activity related to
Minnesota, the exercise of jurisdiction founded merely upon his
insurer's business in the state would offend notions of fairness,
justice, and reasonableness.' 0 2 Further, the mere contractual
arrangement between the defendant and his insurer was
insufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction unless meaningful
ties between the defendant and the forum were shown. 0 3 Thus,
the Court concluded, the fictitious presence of the insurer's
obligation in Minnesota did not, without more, provide a basis for
concluding that there was any contact between Minnesota and
the defendant. 104
" Id. at 322 n.4, 330.
*9 Id. at 321.
100 Id. at 328.
1I Id. at 328-31.
102 Id. at 329.
103 Id.
10 Id. at 329-30.
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Essentially, Rush's holding affirmed the holding in Shaffer:
"[T]he mere presence of property in a State does not establish a
sufficient relationship between the owner of the property and the
State to support the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated
cause of action."os Again, the notion of "true" in rem jurisdiction
escaped the reach of the decision. Thus, a familiar rule was
reiterated: In quasi in rem actions, "U]urisdiction is
lacking .. . unless there are sufficient contacts to satisfy the
fairness standard of International Shoe."o6
As indicated above, Rush's holding falls short of explaining
how to proceed in actions in rem, where jurisdiction may be
predicated on presence alone. The Court stated:
To say that "a debt follows the debtor" is simply to say that
intangible property has no actual situs, and a debt may be sued
on wherever there is jurisdiction over the debtor. State Farm is
"found," in the sense of doing business, in all 50 States and the
District of Columbia. Under [plaintiffl's theory, the "debt" owed
to Rush would be "present" in each of those jurisdictions
simultaneously. It is apparent that such a "contact" can have
no jurisdictional significance.'o
Thus, the Court rejected the Harris fiction as a substitute for
due process and a minimum contacts analysis in a quasi in rem
action as it had in Shaffer.'o Unfortunately, it did not go so far
as to suggest circumstances, if any exist, under which Harris'
notion of situating a debt with its debtor would in fact prove a
practical and effective method of locating intangible property.109
1" Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
10 Id.
107 Id. at 330.
"0s See id. at 328-29 ("[Tlhat the ... insurer does business in the forum State
suggests no further contacts between the defendant and the forum .... The
insurance policy is not the subject matter of the case .. . nor is it related to the
operative facts of the negligence action.").
'0 The Rush decision also focused on an issue of procedure which is beyond the
scope of this article. The Court took issue with the fact that State Farm was not a
named defendant in the case. It observed that "[tihe State's ability to exert its power
over the 'nominal defendant' is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into
the case as a garnishee." Id. at 330-31. Since the Minnesota court lacked jurisdiction
over Rush, it certainly could not, consistent with due process, attach a third party's
obligation to him for purposes of a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff. The obligation of
State Farm to pay Rush was an independent contract with its foundation in Indiana.
Having had almost nothing to do with Minnesota, the Court refused to recognize it
as attachable property.
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3. Application of Daccarett and Rush to the Above
Hypothetical"o
So, where do these cases leave the California government in
the above hypothetical? At the outset, let us characterize
Western Union as a corporate debtor,"1' which contracted with
the Las Vegas buyer to deliver funds to the Mexican farmer.
Under the rationale of Daccarett, the funds could only be seized
either at their origin in Mexico or their final destination in Las
Vegas, since there was no other opportunity for them to "stop"
and be seized. Under Rush, the debt owed by Western Union
would have no jurisdictional significance in and of itself. Since
Western Union does business in all fifty states, the Rush court
would require a "contact in the International Shoe sense"11 2
between Western Union and California. Therefore, the in rem
inquiry would become an in personam inquiry to determine
whether Western Union is amenable to suit in California. This
outcome is directly at odds with the fundamental purpose of in
rem jurisdiction as a substitute form of jurisdiction: "to allow
courts to reach intangible property in the hands of out-of-state
defendants" over whom in personam jurisdiction is
unachievable.'11 Adding further uncertainty to the equation are
the many jurisdictions that purport to hold true to the Harris
fiction.114
n0 See supra Introduction.
n.. See Dickstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 685 A.2d 943, 947
(N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996) ("When, as here, an investor deposits money with a
financial institution a debtor/creditor relationship is created with the investor
retaining intangible property of a debt owed to him by the institution."). "Cash
balances held in an account are considered debts owed by the financial institution to
the investor." Id. at 948.
n2 Rush, 444 U.S. at 329.
us State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 225 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
"4 See, e.g., Af-Cap Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2004)
("[Clourts consistently hold that the situs of a debt obligation is the situs of the
debtor."); Barker v. Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[I]t is
elementary that if [an] obligation ... constitutes a 'debt,' then an attachable res
exists in any jurisdiction wherein the debtor . .. may be found."); Perez v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 469 n.1, 463 N.E.2d 5, 8 n.1, 474 N.Y.S.2d
689, 693 n.1 (1984) (citation omitted) ("Although another aspect of Harris v. Balk
has been overruled, the debt-situs holding remains unimpaired.").
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The current hodgepodge of case law on the situs of modem
forms of debt has created a degree of uncertainty embodied in the
dueling opinions of Western Union.
II. ARIZONA RULES ON THE JURISDICTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
ELECTRONIC DEBTS
This Part analyzes the 2009 Arizona decision in State v.
Western Union Financial Services, Inc.," where the Supreme
Court of Arizona confronted the "location" of electronic debts as
an issue of first impression. Section A introduces Western
Union, the corporation, whose obligation to pay a transnational
exchange became the subject of the court's jurisdictional debate.
This Section briefly discusses the process by which Western
Union facilitated the transfer of money between a sender and
recipient. Section B sets the stage for the court's decision.
Plagued by illegal operations at its borders, the Arizona Attorney
General sought to halt the exchange of monies representing the
proceeds of human smuggling and racketeering by executing a
seizure warrant over the wired funds. Finally, Section C
undertakes an in-depth analysis of the court's opinion. It
explores the rationale behind the court's refusal to recognize the
lasting utility of Harris v. Balk and, ultimately, to issue the
seizure warrants sought.
A. Western Union Financial Services, Inc.
Western Union is a multinational corporation, specializing in
providing wire money -transfers between individuals and
businesses.1 6 It is a Colorado corporation, whose principal place
of business is in that state."' Nevertheless, Western Union
conducts its business throughout the United States and in more
than 195 foreign countries." 8
A customer initiates a "wire" money transfer by paying a
Western Union agent the amount to be transferred and a service
fee.' "The payment is made to a Western Union office either in
n. 208 P.3d 218 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
116 Id. at 218; see also Western Union Services, http://corporate.westernunion.
com/services.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
"' W. Union, 208 P.3d at 219.
us Id.
119 Id.
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person, by telephone, or over the Internet, and that office makes
the specified sum of money available at .... any one of
thousands of similar locations throughout the nation,
hemisphere, and, indeed, nearly the entire world."120 The agent
enters the information into Western Union's computer system,
which assigns a control number to the transaction. 121  The
money-now represented in Western Union's computer system as
electronic creditsl 2 2-may then be accessed by the intended
recipient upon presenting personal identification and the
designated control number at any Western Union location.123
The transaction may be cancelled by the sender and refunded
until the moment the money is actually paid to the recipient.124
B. Background on Arizona's Human Trafficking Problem
In recent years, human smuggling has emerged as an
"organized business" in Arizona.125 Facilitated by an abundance
of Western Union locations throughout Arizona and its
neighboring Mexican states, an estimated $1.7 billion is
120 Id. at 230.
121 Id. at 219.
122 See id. at 230. "Electronic credit" is a modern banking industry term used to
describe "internal communications" which represent transfers of money. Id.; see also
Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998). ("The
rules governing bank money operate on nothing but communications: Money is
(carefully regulated) talk. . . . [Tihe location of electronic bank monies can have no
existence outside these communications. Bank money exists when we say it exists,
and it exists where we say it exists. Therefore, the location of bank money can only
have significance as a conflict-of-law rule."). These communications have obviated
the need for any "cash, currency, check, note, or bank draft of any sort [to be] sent,
transported, or routed through any geographic channels between the sender and
receiver." W. Union, 208 P.3d at 230. Rather, they function as "authorization to pay
to a designated receiver a specified amount of money under certain circumstances."
Id. For our purposes, these communications will be analyzed in terms of a debt:
"[Western Union's] contractual obligation represented by the [electronic credits] to
pay monies used or intended to be used to facilitate human smuggling or narcotics
trafficking.. . ." State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 199 P.3d 592, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008); see also W. Union, 208 P.3d at 229 (Espinosa, J., dissenting) ("Western Union
contracts with senders to transmit-in actuality, to make available-specified funds
to remote receivers. The resulting electronic credits are thus conceptually and
pragmatically debts or obligations while on the books of Western Union before they
are paid out.").
" W. Union, 208 P.3d at 219.
124 Id.
121 Holstege, supra note 11.
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exchanged annually for the services of "coyotes," or professional
human traffickers.1 26 This illegal enterprise formed the impetus
for Western Union. In September, 2006, the Arizona Attorney
General applied to the Arizona Superior Court for a warrant
authorizing the seizure for forfeiture of various Western Union
transfers sent to or from Arizona.127 The Attorney General
alleged that certain Western Union transfers represented the
proceeds of illegal human and narcotics trafficking in violation of
the state's civil forfeiture law. 28 According to the State's
supporting affidavit, "[o]nce in Arizona, immigrants often are
detained by force in secured locations until sponsors (family,
friends, or prospective employers) wire money to associates of the
smugglers."'29 Furthermore, "[alfter payment, the immigrants
are released and make their way to destinations in Arizona or
elsewhere."o3 0  The affidavit also alleged that similar transfers
represented the proceeds of sales of drugs smuggled into the
United States via the Arizona border.' 3
C. The Jurisdictional Battle: Seizure Warrants and Territorial
Complications
1. Procedural History
The Arizona Superior Court granted the State's warrant
request that same day, finding "that there [was] probable cause
to believe that conduct giving rise to forfeiture ha[d] occurred
with respect to all of the property described. . . and that
forfeiture [was] authorized.. ."13 The warrant authorized
agents of the state to seize "person-to-person" wire transfers
originating in twenty-eight states other than Arizona, with
destinations in twenty-six locations in the state of Sonora,
126 Id. ("Statewide, about [five] percent of Western Union outlets were
responsible for [eighty] percent of the most suspicious transactions . . .
12 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 219.
128 Id.
129 Id.
120 Id.
1s1 Id.
232 State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 199 P.3d 592, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)
(first ommission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether the action
by the superior court is authorized by Arizona's civil forfeiture statutes is beyond the
scope of this Note.
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Mexico.'a By the terms of the warrant, Western Union was
ordered to stop payment whenever payment of a transfer covered
by the warrant was sought, and to deposit the funds into a state-
created detention account. 134
Upon Western Union's motion to quash the warrant, the
Arizona Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hearing, during
which the court granted Western Union's motions, finding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred its
exercise of jurisdiction over money transfers directed to Mexico
that originated in neighboring states.'3  Upon review, the Court
of Appeals of Arizona vacated the Superior Court's judgment.136
Western Union had conceded that its "continuous and
systematic"137 activities within Arizona rendered it amenable to
general jurisdiction there. 3 s Therefore, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that its debts could be considered present in
the state for purposes of in rem jurisdiction.3 3 The court of
appeals also conducted a "minimum contacts" analysis to
determine that the nexus between the smuggling operations and
the state of Arizona was sufficient to pass constitutional muster
under International Shoe. 40
" See State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 208 P.3d 218, 219 (Ariz. 2009) (en
banc).
134 See id. Specifically:
Western Union was required to (1) stop payment and transfer the funds to
a detention account, (2) notify the intended recipient of the detention and
provide that person with information to contact the seizing agency, (3)
retain the funds, except those released by the seizing agency, in the
detention account for twenty-one days after the warrant expired, and (4)
convey any remaining detained funds to the clerk of the superior court in
Maricopa County upon the expiration of the twenty-one-day period.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc.,
199 P.3d 592, 598-99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)).
"I Id. at 220.
16 State v. W. Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 199 P.3d 592, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
13 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)
(citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)).
.3. See W. Union, 208 P.3d at 220.
119 See supra Part I.C and note 16 (providing support for determination that
issuance of seizure warrant is a proceeding in rem).
1o See W. Union, 199 P.3d at 605-06.
[Tihe res constitutes proceeds from human smuggling and narcotics
trafficking activities that predominantly occurred in Arizona.... [The
undocumented immigrants, "UDIs,"] are brought into Arizona, held hostage
in Arizona, an agreement for release is negotiated from Arizona with the
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2. Arizona's Supreme Court Rules
In quite circuitous fashion, the state's high court rejected the
possibility that the targeted money transfers were "located" in
Arizona for jurisdictional purposes.14 1 The court began its
analysis by noting that Western Union's activities in Arizona
allow for the exercise of general jurisdiction over it, a finding that
presumably would weigh in the State's favor since "the
Fourteenth Amendment poses no bar to an Arizona
court . . . issuing in personam orders to Western Union governing
the disposition of wire transfers involving the proceeds of
racketeering conducted" there.142 Thus, the court framed the
issue as a procedural one, elevating form over substance, and
suggested that, had the State pursued in personam action
against Western Union, the location of the funds would prove no
obstacle to their seizure. The court then engaged in a historical
discussion of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, reciting the
post-Shaffer doctrine as it applied to quasi in rem jurisdiction, to
wit, jurisdiction could no longer be premised solely on "location"
and "the end question [is] whether there [is] jurisdiction over the
party against whom the plaintiff ultimately asserted liability."
Nevertheless, location within the forum state remains a
necessary predicate to the achievement of "true" in rem
jurisdiction.1 44
Simply put, the court used Shaffer as a demarcation between
forms of action where location is not germane to an exercise of
jurisdiction-in personam-and those where it is-true in rem.
As discussed above, quasi in rem jurisdiction is caught
somewhere between the two-in personam and in rem
sponsor, and the coyote performs the agreement in Arizona by releasing the
UDI upon notification of payment by the sponsor. The owners or beneficial
interest holders in the [electronic credits], who are parties to this illegal
enterprise, purposefully facilitated illegal acts in Arizona and should expect
therefore to adjudicate their rights to the res in Arizona.
Id. at 606.
14 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 226.
142 Id. at 220.
"a Id. at 222 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977)). The court
explained that "since Shaffer, the Harris fiction no longer has any relevance in quasi
in rem actions; the focus is now on the defendant's contacts with the forum state."
Id. at 225.
I" Id. at 222.
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jurisdiction-where location is relevant to the extent it provides
a contact in the International Shoe sense. .14 Thus, location is
irrelevant where a claim is unrelated to the property at issue
because the constitutional inquiry now focuses on the contacts of
the party over whom liability is sought. However, "the Supreme
Court's post-International Shoe jurisprudence makes plain that a
necessary prerequisite to ['true'] in rem jurisdiction [where the
suit is related to the property itselfJ is the location of the subject
property within the forum state."14 6
The court questioned the aptness of the Harris fiction in
analyzing the location of this property. 147 It distinguished Harris
factually, differentiating between the "ordinary debt" owed in
Harris-which it characterized as a contractual obligation to the
creditor-from Western Union's contractual obligation to the
debtor to deliver funds to a given recipient.'4 8 "Western Union's
role in the wire transfers is more akin to that of a courier,"
reasoned the court.149  Just as Arizona could not exercise
jurisdiction over a package sent from Colorado to Mexico via
UPS, the State could not seize electronic funds merely
"deliver [ed]" via Western Union.150
The court also rejected Harris doctrinally. Relying on its
reasoning above, the court distinguished Rush as irrelevant to a
discussion of Harris since "the situs of intangible property
unrelated to a plaintiffs claim has no application whatsoever
after Shaffer to the constitutional analysis."' 5' Essentially the
court recognized that location, in and of itself, has been replaced
in the quasi in rem analysis by minimum contacts-Shaffer, as
we have seen, vitiates the need for the property's presence in the
forum state when the claim is unrelated. As such, courts need
" See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 ("[T]he presence of property in a State may bear
on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the
defendant, and the litigation.").
14 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 222.
11 Id. at 223.
14 See id.
149 Id.
'5o See id. This would be true, the court said, even if the contents of the package
contained proceeds of racketeering committed in Arizona and if UPS was amenable
to general jurisdiction there. See id.
151 Id. at 224 (emphasis added). Presumably, the court's dismissal of Rush would
apply to all instances of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
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not concern themselves with Harris, or any other method of
locating property, for that matter: "If those with interests in the
property are subject to in personam jurisdiction in the forum
state, a court in that state undoubtedly has jurisdiction
consistent with the Due Process Clause to enter orders relating
to the property."1 52
Unfortunately, curiously similar to the Rush Court, the
Arizona court ended its reasoning there. Though correctly
recognizing Shaffer's consequences on quasi in rem jurisdiction,
both courts stopped short of ruling on Harris' applicability to in
rem actions when presence in the state is a necessary predicate
to jurisdiction. Even if location is largely immaterial to a quasi
in rem action, it is still the linchpin of exercising "true" in rem
jurisdiction. Thus, some legal apparatus will inevitably be
necessary for ascertaining the location of intangible property
related to the litigation.
In the end, acquiescing that the Supreme Court has
"expressly pretermitted whether in rem jurisdiction over
intangibles ... can be exercised in more than one state,"' the
court concluded by refusing to accept that "a wire transfer
originated in another state by [a nonresident] and directed to a
recipient in a foreign country who also [is a non]resident is
'located' in Arizona simply because Western Union, a foreign
corporation, is amenable to suit here."54
The court declined to recognize that perhaps these facts
presented an opportunity to modernize its analysis, explaining
that "[tihe technical complexities of the electronic age should not
blind courts to the substance of transactions in conducting
15 Id. at 225. Although suggesting that those with "interests" in the property
are undoubtedly "subject to in personam jurisdiction in the forum state," the court
used the term "interests" to the State's disadvantage earlier in the opinion. Id.
Arizona's forfeiture statute provides for jurisdiction "if the courts of this state have
in personam jurisdiction of an owner of or interest holder in the property." ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4302 (2011) (emphasis added). However, the "Definitions" section of
the statute defines an "[ilnterest holder" as "a person in whose favor there is a
security interest or who is the beneficiary of a perfected encumbrance pertaining to
an interest in property." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4301(4) (2011). In the court of
appeals' proceedings, it was held that Western Union did not satisfy this category.
W. Union, 208 P.3d at 220 n.2. Clearly, therefore, the court's reasoning for rejecting
Harris is too narrow since it does not even include Western Union.
... W. Union, 208 P.3d at 225.
154 Id- at 22f
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jurisdictional analyses.""' This author disagrees. The court
unwisely rejected the occasion to espouse the very technological
complexities it dismissed, by ironically snubbing the possibility of
a debt being "simultaneously located in every state in which
Western Union can be sued" as "mechanical" and "outworn."'56
Judge Espinosa took a less traditional approach than his
colleagues, arguing that the majority's holding "avoids grappling
with the key feature of the jurisdictional question presented: the
implication of a relatively new species of intangible property that
has no singular location."' 7 Notwithstanding his ostensibly
innovative perspective, the dissenting judge ultimately agreed
with the majority that Harris does not apply, only for different
reasons than those proffered in its opinion. 58  According to
Espinosa, the majority "conflates presence, a necessary
component of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction itself."' 9 Essentially,
what the Court has renounced is simply quasi in rem jurisdiction
predicated on presence alone, not the idea that it is logical to
situate a debt where his debtor is found for jurisdictional
purposes. 6 0 So, Harris is inapplicable here only because it held
that quasi in rem jurisdiction may be "premised on nothing more
than the transitory presence of a debtor and his debt to an
unrelated third party."'6 ' This is not to say, however, that
there is anything troublesome, or unconstitutional, about the
theoretical location of a debt residing where its owner is found.162
The majority confuses its principles, mistakenly assuming that
by finding Western Union's debt in every state in which it does
business, it would automatically be creating jurisdiction in all of
those locations. 6 3  This, argued Espinosa, is the real issue
... Id. at 223-24.
156 Id. at 224.
157 Id. at 227 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 228.
.' Id. at 229.
"n See id. ("[Wihat has been laid to rest is the use of the debt-follows-the-debtor
doctrine as a substitute for due process and minimum contacts analysis when
invoking in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.").
161 Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
162 See id. at 231 ("[Alcknowledging that in rem jurisdiction cannot be premised
solely on the situs of a debt does not explain why multijurisdictional situs is
factually or legally untenable.").
16 See id. ("The notion that intangible electronic credits are present anywhere
they can be redeemed is neither outlandish nor troublesome, as the majority
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presented, and the crux of the modern jurisdictional problem:
Until the courts recognize this new brand of ubiquitous
intangible property, they will struggle to adequately determine
the contours of its jurisdictional significance.'16 Espinosa posits
that the failure of the majority to capitalize on this opportunity
to update existing methodology essentially builds "a straw man
on the bleached bones of Harris v. Balk, and then knock[s] it
down."'*6  Espinosa's conceptualization of a "new species" of
intangible property, simultaneously present in every place its
ownerl6 6 is found, is the fulcrum of the next section.
III. RETHINKING THE SITUS OF INTANGIBLES IN THE
INTERNET AGE
This Section argues for the Harris fiction's lasting utility and
its relevance in the modern era. In light of the complexities
modern technology poses to rigid jurisdictional analyses, Harris
applies more than ever. Section A examines precisely the type of
ubiquitous intangible property we have been considering. It
attempts to illustrate the boundless contours of electronic credits
and other "cyber property." Section B sets forth a two-pronged
inquiry for situating this type of property, which revives Harris
while remaining faithful to the concerns of Shaffer and
International Shoe.
suggests. It relates only to the situs of the credits and does not, in the case of a
company with multistate presence, automatically or 'mechanically,' create
jurisdiction in every state in which the credits can be said to exist.").
"See id. at 232-33 ("[T]he majority... avoids the real-world situation
presented in this case by applying traditional jurisdictional analysis and
sidestepping the novel issues created by evolving technology and ever-adapting
criminal methodologies. In so doing, this court misses a compelling opportunity to
appropriately advance the law in accord with changing societal needs.").
16 Id. at 227.
16 In both W. Union and Harris, the issue was not focused on who the actual
"owner" of the property was. Since both cases involved locating a debt, the courts
applied the jurisdictional analysis developed for "owners" of property to the
respective debtors who were in possession thereof. Surely, deciding who "owns" a
debt is a larger issue to be left for another day.
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A. Electronic Debts and Other "Cyber Property"
The "electronic credits" at issue in Western Union are part of
a larger family of modern property interests that, as Judge
Espinosa explained, "ha[ve] no singular location."6 7 Contrary to
the majority's contention that the Supreme Court has
"pretermitted" whether intangibles may be legally situated in
more than one state,es the Court has, in fact, suggested that
certain intangible properties may not be limited to a solitary
location.6 In that respect, they are analogous to other
outgrowths of the internet age, particularly e-mail and other
transmittable digital data.170 These unique forms of attachable
res exist in a "place" that is omnipresent and amorphous, rather
than bound by geographic limitations.171 Consequently, they pose
never-before-seen problems to traditional bases of jurisdiction
that were rooted in the logic of physics and have, therefore,
endured by situating property in a discernible time and place.1 2
.' W. Union, 208 P.3d at 227-28 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 225.
161 See Dickstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 685 A.2d 943,
948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996) ("[W]hen property is intangible, jurisdiction over
it may not be limited to one state.").
170 See W. Union, 208 P.3d at 230 (Espinosa, J., dissenting) ("[J]ust like e-mail
communications whose receipt is not limited to any particular location or computer,
such electronic credits necessarily exist simultaneously in every place they can be
instantly received.").
"1 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) ("[A] unique medium-known to
its users as 'cyberspace'-located in no particular geographical location but available
to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.").
172 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 1073.1 ("[T]echnological advances such
as . . . the Internet . . . . raise[ I significant questions about the application of
traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine.").
[W]hen courts apply rules designed for cases filed in physical courts to
Internet disputes, certain legal quagmires emerge. For instance, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine in a legally principled way "where"
an online transaction took place between a buyer and seller from different
states or countries. . . . Traditional location-based legal determinations do
not function well when applied to interstate e-commerce transactions.
Galves, supra note 20, at 6-7. Indeed, the applicability of traditional conceptions of
in rem jurisdiction has been a subject of much scholarly debate, particularly in the
realm of Internet domain names and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act. See generally Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243 (2002);
Moringiello, supra note 20; Lee, supra note 34.
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Needless to say, applying place-based analyses to placeless
property is an exercise in futility. Therefore, as commentators
have observed, "the rule of law must keep pace with the growth
of the Internet.""7 Although the holding in Harris was limited to
quasi in rem actions, its central underpinning-situating a debt
with its debtor-should be recognized as applying to "true" in
rem actions as well. In fact, the actualization of a species of
property that is conceptually and physically present everywhere
it is instantly receivable demands the awakening of the Harris
fiction to make such a thing accessible for the administration of
justice. As Judge Espinosa fittingly put it:
The very term "electronic credit" illustrates the problem
because it aptly describes the abstraction that is at the heart of
the transactions and wire transfers involved here. If a Western
Union wire transfer ... cannot be found, in both a conceptual
and practical sense, wherever Western Union does business and
routinely pays out on such transfers, then it is nowhere to be
found, because, in Western Union's global, computerized
accounting system, these electronic credits have no more
"location" than does an e-mail message once the "send" button is
clicked. 1
B. The Argument for a Two-Pronged Analysis
1. How Can You Locate Something that Is Everywhere?
Although determining the "location" of intangible property is
a legal fiction,"' courts nevertheless undertake to assign it a
situs. 76  But, without adherence to Harris' debt-follows-the-
debtor reasoning, electronic credits-or e-mails, banking
173 Galves, supra note 20, at 6.
174 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 228 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
175 See People v. McGraw Elec. Co., 30 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Ill. 1940) ("When we
deal with intangible property, such as credits and choses in action generally, we
encounter the difficulty that by reason of the absence of physical characteristics they
have no situs in the physical sense, but have the situs attributable to them in legal
conception." (quoting Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209 (1936)).
" See Kaiser-Ducett Corp. v. Chicago-Joliet Livestock Mktg. Ctr., Inc., 407
N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("[Flor ease of administration, for a
determination of jurisdiction, and for other reasons, intangible personal property is
often presumed to have a location.").
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information, etcetera-are, in actuality, nowhere to be found.177
The majority in Western Union speculated that perhaps it would
be reasonable to situate the electronic credits in either the state
from which they were sent until collected; or in Colorado,
Western Union's state of incorporation. Sensible though these
alternatives may seem, any other state burdened by the
transaction would be left without a remedy-a fundamentally
unjust result. This reasoning seems to tip the scales in favor of
the putative criminals, turning a blind eye to the realities of the
transaction so as to not offend traditional jurisdictional analyses.
Affixing Western Union's debt to the corporation's legal presence
is, in many cases, the only way a state-Arizona, for example, or
California in our hypothetical-seeking to exercise "true" in rem
jurisdiction over money transfers can do so. Until now,
property's presence within the forum state was indicative of the
relationship between the cause of action and that property.
Indeed, in Harris, the debt-although intangible-had a
discernible singular location: wherever the individual debtor was.
However, as was the case in Western Union, contemporary forms
of intangible property can have a profound impact on states in
which they are not physically located, as well as those to which
their owner has never been. Thus, to the extent that Western
Union makes its debts available in all fifty states and 195 foreign
countries, the holding in Harris is not a fiction at all. 78
Therefore, in situations where it becomes necessary to
commit intangible property to a singular location, Harris
remains a logical and effective method of doing so. Indeed,
utilizing the Harris fiction in this way does not mechanically
create jurisdiction in every location a corporate debtor does
"' See W. Union, 208 P.3d at 230 (Espinosa, J., dissenting) ("The relevance of
this real-world situation to the present legal issue is that . .. electronic credits have
no actual physical location once they are created in Western Union's computer
system. Instead, just like e-mail communications whose receipt is not limited to
any particular location or computer, such electronic credits necessarily exist
simultaneously in every place they can be instantly received.").
"1 See id. at 229 ("No 'fiction' at all is needed to see that, if an intended receiver
of funds can go to any Western Union station and instantly receive the money, the
funds must be at that location, both conceptually and physically. That the electronic
credits are therefore present "in any place where Western Union maintains an
office," if that is congruent with any location where the funds can be disbursed, is
simply a fact of this modern business practice . . . .").
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business. Instead, the fiction merely identifies the field of
possible forums the property can be deemed "located." It allows
courts to consider the property "within" a certain territory, so
that they may proceed to the second part of the inquiry,
discussed below: whether the required nexus exists between the
property, the forum, and the subject of the litigation.
2. Staying Faithful to International Shoe
Reviving Harris to determine the location of intangibles such
as these comports with the same notions of fair play and
substantial justice championed in International Shoe. The
primary distinction between in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdictions is that the former requires some positive nexus
between the property and the subject of litigation.17 9  By the
Western Union majority's reasoning, even states that have been
substantially affected by the intangible property-or exchange,
or consequence thereof-have available to them no legal
remedies vis-A-vis the property simply by virtue of the fact that
the forum was not affected in some physical way by the property
itself.
Powerful normative arguments, however, support the rights
of Arizona against Western Union. As Judge Espinosa explained:
The unique intangible property here, while under the exclusive
control of Western Union, is necessarily located at every
Western Union office where it can be collected at will, including
Western Union's offices in Arizona-the forum directly
connected to the litigation. The money underlying these
electronic credits is payment for drugs or ransom for hostages
being held and often abused in clandestine locations in Arizona.
The state's overriding interest in this money is the prevention of
drug and human smuggling and the attendant violence,
179 See Consumers United Ins. Co. v. Syverson, 738 P.2d 110, 112 (Mont. 1987)
(requiring positive nexus between nonresident who wired funds to in-state bank, the
state and the subject of litigation); see also FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v.
FleetBostonFinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134 (D. Mass. 2001) ("The logic of
Shaffer's limitations ... extend[s] to actions in which the existence of the property in
the state cannot fairly be said to represent meaningful contacts between the forum
state, the defendant, and the litigation."); Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 520 So. 2d
575, 578 (Fla. 1988) ("Where the action is .. . on a debt ... a defendant has the
privilege of being sued either in the county of his residence or in the county where
the cause of action accrued.") (emphasis added).
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degradation, suffering, and economic harm such activities visit
on Arizona's communities.... [I]f fairness is the touchstone of
contemporary jurisdictional jurisprudence, it is without
question fair and concordant with traditional notions of due
process to anticipate that the transferred money-and, by
extension, its owners-should be subject to the authority of this
state's courts .. 8. 0
The nexus between Arizona's interest in state sovereignty-
that is, protecting those within its borders from the inherent
consequences of human-smuggling operations-and the money
representing those illegal operations would undoubtedly be
sufficient under any variation of the "minimum contacts"
analysis to hale the putative perpetrators into an Arizona court.
As the law stands, however, absent a finding that the electronic
credits are present in Arizona, such an analysis fails to invoke
"true" in rem jurisdiction.
This incongruity is patently at odds with the "fairness"
standard advanced in International Shoe. In International Shoe,
a Delaware corporation was amenable to suit in Washington
when it had its principle place of business in Missouri and
employed between eleven and thirteen traveling salesmen in
Washington.' 8' Despite the fact that the company had no offices
in Washington, made no contracts for sale there, and kept no
merchandise there, the Court found that International Shoe's
business in Washington was of such a substantial nature as to
make it "reasonable and just according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state
to enforce the obligations which [International Shoe] [had]
incurred there."8 2 Per Justice Stone, the Court articulated the
constitutional inquiry as turning on "the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the [Dlue [Pirocess [C]lause
to insure."83 By this standard, it seems difficult to imagine how,
when faced with the deplorable and inhumane business of
human smuggling, a court can determine that the very state
180 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 232 (Espinosa, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
181 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1945).
182 Id. at 320.
183 Id. at 319.
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through which these individuals are essentially sold has no legal
device to thwart the practice. Such a result is acutely unfair.
Further, Judge Espinosa suggested that if Arizona cannot
exercise in rem jurisdiction over the electronic credits, no state
can: Arizona seemingly has more connection to the property, and
therefore better chances of satisfying a "minimum contacts" test,
than any other state does."' Thus, the money is virtually
untouchable.
Indeed, concern for public policy has existed at the heart of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence since its infancy. The famed
Justice Cardozo declined to divorce Harris's reasoning from the
concept of fairness that would later elevate International Shoe to
the doctrine's forefront:
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there
are times when justice or convenience requires that a legal situs
be ascribed to them. The locality selected is for some
purposes ... any place where the debtor can be found. At the
root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of
the requirements of justice and convenience in particular
conditions.'85
The Western Union court did not so much strictly adhere to
an antiquated doctrine, as it stubbornly refused to recognize the
need for a new one. Failing to acknowledge the modern necessity
for the Harris fiction is an impingement on states' abilities to
protect their own conceptions of public policy, not to mention an
affront to the fundamental fairness that purportedly has served
as the "touchstone" for modern personal jurisdiction law."' As a
1" See W. Union, 208 P.3d at 231 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
Only Arizona can arguably satisfy the minimum contacts requirements of
International Shoe and Shaffer because the wire-transferred payments are
at the very heart of the litigation here.. . . [T]o find that jurisdiction exists
in [Colorado or the transfers' states of origin] would require application of
the "mechanical rule" proscribed by Shaffer. If one accepts that Western
Union's ubiquitous electronic credits are somehow more authentically
"present" in those states than in Arizona, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction
in those forums would be problematic, if not flatly unconstitutional,
because the intangible property would lack any meaningful contact with
those jurisdictions.
Id.
.85 Severnoe Secs. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24,
174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931) (emphasis added).
1" W. Union, 208 P.3d at 232 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
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result, the very liberties sought to be protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be breached
by courts' reluctance to adapt to the Internet Age."a7
CONCLUSION
As can be expected, reliance on Western Union for a
resolution to our hypothetical likely leaves California in about
the same shoes as the Arizona Supreme Court left its Attorney
General. Since the wires were neither sent nor received by
California residents, and since the money was never in the
"possession" of a California bank, the state is left without a
jurisdictional solution to its drug and human trafficking
problems. However, a judicial willingness to accept a modern
form of the Harris fiction would allow California to flex its crime-
prevention muscles. Espousing Harris simply as a method of
situating a debt for jurisdictional purposes-rather than as a
means of actually obtaining jurisdiction-courts can avoid the
Due Process problems originally inherent in the principle. For
instance, had Judge Espinosa's reasoning carried the day, the
money representing proceeds of marijuana smuggled into
California for deposit in Las Vegas would be "located" wherever
the buyer could access his funds from a Western Union agent.
This, as we have determined, is in every state and hundreds of
destinations around the world. As the majority in Western Union
pointed out, were this to create jurisdiction over Western Union
in each of those places, certainly due process would be offended.
However, requiring a sufficient nexus between the cause of action
and the wires would ensure that only those locations that may
fairly adjudicate the rights of the property in the interest of
justice could do so. For better or worse, other "real life" examples
abound.
That Harris was decided in 1905, International Shoe in 1945,
and Shaffer in 1977 is reason enough to revisit and re-evaluate
the principles announced therein. Certainly, the Court could not
have anticipated at the times of these decisions a twenty-first-
century society where financial transactions are completed
187 See Allen, supra note 172, at 266 ("When courts fail to consider the
substantive interests the doctrine is meant to protect, they run the very real risk
that these interests will not be safeguarded.").
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instantly via computerized communications. Similarly, the
reasoning underlying these seminal decisions does not
contemplate the species of property at the heart of this Note-
intangible interests that have obviated the notion of "cash,
currency, check, note or bank draft of any sort."88 At the time of
Harris it was unnecessary and illogical to consider a transaction
that was not "sent, transported, or routed through any
geographic channels between the sender and receiver."'8 9 Many
modern scholars would be hard-pressed to imagine a business
world that still employed such antiquated methods. For these
reasons, it is crucial for courts to recognize the lasting vitality of
the Harris fiction and, perhaps, that in our modern Internet Age,
it is no longer a fiction at all.
188 W. Union, 208 P.3d at 230 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
189 Id.
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